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Abstract: Digitalization in Sub-Saharan Africa enhanced the accessibility of communications 
by the majority of the poor who had been excluded among others from social media, 
independent information channels, mobile banking and e-commerce. The creation of new 
economic opportunities, e.g. the pay-as-you-go business, and increased flow of information also 
boosted people’s self-esteem, sense of belonging and citizenship. The smartphone became the 
main source of internet access which also bridged the divide between urban and rural 
communities. Thus, mobile telecommunications contributed positively to economic growth even 
in less developed regions, and there is still ample space for further improvement. Yet, Africans 
were also confronted with new forms of the digital divide between the poor and the rich, 
between advanced and less advanced African countries, as well as between Africa and the rest 
of the world. Moreover, the digitalization of the public sphere became a double-edged sword. 
Autocratic governments like Sudan and Togo shut down the internet during elections to 
facilitate the rigging of the polls. The lack of transparency and objectivity fuelled fake news 
which rapidly spread in social media, notably in times of the Corona crisis. Last, but not least, 
not everybody surfing on the internet had the same access to quality information. For example, 
disinformation was supported clandestinely by foreign powers to destabilize political regimes, 
or spy software was provided to governments to control the opposition. Both false news in 
social media and spy software impeded poverty relief in Africa significantly.  
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(1) Introduction: Development of digitalization in SSA  
 
New information and communication technologies (ICT) have changed lives significantly all 
over the world by providing new ways of communication, paying, selling, studying etc. This 
holds also for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The rapid spread of mobile phones in large parts of 
Africa since the 2000s also opened access to the internet. It herewith contributed to bridging 
the divide between urban and rural Africa just as between the rich and the poor (Sedkaoui-
2014; De Bruijn, 2019).  
 
Mobile subscriber penetration in SSA increased to  44% or 456 million in 2018, an increase of 
20 million over the previous year. Moreover, about 239 million, i.e. 23% of the population, 
also used the mobile internet regularly. Accordingly, SSA remained worldwide the fastest 
growing region (GSMA-2019).  
 
Map 1: Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) - Sub-Saharan Africa (2020)  
 
  
Source: International Telecommunication Union ( ITU ) (World Bank)  
 
Even in small and remote LDCs, like West African Togo, the mobile phone user penetration 
rate soared by 700% in five years from 2013 to 2018, with about 80% of the population using 
a mobile phone in 2018 (Kohnert, 2021, BTI-Togo, 2022). Internet access improved with 17% 
of the Togolese population with regular access to the internet in December 2017, compared to 
2.4% of the population in 2008. In January 2020, 1.71 million Togolese were connected to the 
internet, an increase of 7.8% compared with 2019. The overall internet penetration rate was 
now 21%, including 43.1% via mobile, 56.1% by computer, 0.7% by tablet. 650,000 
subscribers were active on social networks (+ 14% between April 2019 and January 2020). 
580,000 users regularly accessed Facebook (95.9% by mobile), 72,000 to Instagram, 170,000 
to LinkedIn (republicoftogo.com, 19.02.2020). Three major Instagram macro-influencers in 
Togo had an average of 81 860 followers. The total reach of all Togolese Instagram macro-
influencers combined was 245 581 followers (Hypetrace.com, 2020). TikTok is said to be 
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used increasingly by Togo’s teenagers too. Influencers like the comedian influencer 
#Roland_Tikena allegedly counted more than 12 Mio. Views.  
 
Therefore, all over Africa, digitalization was heralded as a glorious ‘digital revolution’, or 
Third Industrial Revolution, providing for unimagined economic opportunities, enhanced flow 
of information and inspiring people’s definition of self-awareness, belonging and citizenship 
(De Bruijn, 2019). It changed the way people and nations interacted, to create a ‘new 
civilization’ In this sense, ICT was considered essential to reach Africa's Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) (Sedkaoui, 2014).  
 
Graph 1: Mobile internet connectivity in SSA (2020)  
 
  
Source: Wyrzykowski, Robert (2020)  
 
 
Yet, there is an additional demographical challenge that has to be confronted. West African 
urban centres for example will double their population by 2050. Even if sustainable economic 
growth could be established, governments would have to ensure that it is inclusive and the 
population does not fall into a poverty trap. Yet, whether even the most disadvantaged, can 
reap the benefits of the ‘digital revolution’ will depend on their access to digital infrastructure 
and the human skills to operate them. Moreover, sustainable development depends on an 
efficient implementation ecosystem, notably in the cities with their considerable socio-
environmental and socio-economic challenges (Chenal, 2021). 
 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, 3G coverage expanded to 75% compared to 63% in 2017, while 4G 
doubled to nearly 50% compared to 2017. In 2019, mobile broadband (3G and 4G) 
connections outnumbered for the first time 2G connections in SSA (Wyrzykowski, 2020). The 
coverage gap halved from 50% in 2014 to 25% in 2019. Nevertheless, the SSA coverage gap 
remained the highest globally. The region included 67% of the world’s population that were 
not covered by mobile broadband. Economic and technical problems complicated the 
reduction of this gap. First, because the disposition of new sites in sparsely populated and 
remote rural areas could cost up to twice as much and could be three times more expensive to 
run (Wyrzykowski, 2020). 
 
Despite the bottlenecks in mobile broadband and internet use its significance also for politics 
increased rapidly. Thus, social media networks like Twitter and Instagram were increasingly 
used both by the government and the opposition. This blessing, however, proved to be 
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ambivalent, notably in the case of authoritarian regimes like Togo. Accordingly, Lomé 
repeatedly blocked access during presidential elections, apparently to rig the polls, including 
temporary blocks on mobile phones and internet service, to prevent social networking. 
Besides, Lomé used highly sophisticated software, like the infamous Israeli logiciel ‘Pegasus’ 
to target Catholic clerics and Civil Society militants to spy on mobile phones and internet 
traffic of the opposition. Officially, the software had been sold to the government in Lomé to 
fight terrorism and serious crime. Last, but not least, human rights organizations urged the 
Togolese government, which is based on a small elite from a minority ethnic group, the 
Kabyé, for seven decades, to refrain from inciting ethnic hatred in the media and social 
networks.  
 
Thus, digital spaces have become increasingly important for organizing political uprisings and 
opposition movements all over Africa. Several regimes shut down the internet or blocked 
social media apps. Although web disruptions increased globally, African countries were 
dominating shutdowns in 2019. For example, they restricted social media platforms like 
WhatsApp and Telegram and disabled SMS text messaging. In 2019, Ethiopia, Sudan, DR 
Congo, and Chad were among the countries that entered the year totally or partially offline. 
Later on, they were joined by similar autocratic regimes in Algeria, Benin, Eritrea, 
Mauritania, Liberia, and Somalia (Dahir, 2019; Garbe, 2020).  
 
In addition, governments turned to digital surveillance technology as a shrewder way to crush 
opposition, thereby sidestepping economic costs and global criticism that these online 
shutdowns might encounter. The despotic regime in Lomé, quoted above, apparently was no 
exception. The University of Toronto's Citizen Lab, which investigates information controls, 
like digital espionage against civil society, revealed in a recent report titled "Running in 
Circles: Uncovering the Clients of Cyberespionage Firm, Circles", how the government in at 
least seven other African countries, i.e. Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe, were using surveillance technology developed by Israeli 
telecom company Circles to spy on the personal communications of opposition politicians, 
human rights activists and journalists. These seven African countries were among 25 around 
the world using Circles, which was closely affiliated with the notorious NSO Group whose 
invasive Pegasus spyware was used to target human rights activists, key figures of the 
opposition and journalists worldwide (Dadoo, 2021).  
 
 
(2) The impact of digitalization on poverty-alleviation in SSA  
 
Despite remarkable improvements in mobile broadband coverage, the usage of mobile 
internet gap increased from 36% in 2014 to 49% in 2019, as mobile usage does not grow as 
fast in the newly covered areas as network deployment. This challenge was especially 
pronounced at the SSA sub-regional level. Central Africa, for example, which lacked behind 
in its infrastructure development in general, had the highest coverage gap with 42% in 2019, 
whereas the user gab was most pronounced in Eastern Africa (60%), followed by Southern 
Africa (49%). Kenya, the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and Zambia counted among those who 
improved mobile internet penetration most between 2014 and 2019. The best enablers, e.g. 
concerning affordability, were Mauritius, Nigeria, Botswana, South Africa and Ghana 
(Wyrzykowski, 2020). Unsurprisingly, these countries were also among the 15 best SSA 
performers in GDP per capita, i.e. Mauritius (2), Botswana (4), South Africa (6), Ghana (11) 




The gap in mobile internet use disproportionately affected the rural population, women and 
the poor. The large gender- and the rural-urban gap in mobile internet use in SSA, standing at 
37% and 60% respectively, was much higher than the average of low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs). Both, the gender and rural-urban gaps do not yet show any signs of 
narrowing (Wyrzykowski, 2020). Key barriers for enhanced adoption of mobile internet were 
the lack of awareness (25% of adults) and the lack of literacy and digital skills, followed by 
affordability and perceived relevance. 
 
Graph 2: Coverage and usage gaps of mobile internet in SSA  
 
  
Source: Wyrzykowski, Robert (2020)  
 
Graph 3: Most improved SSA countries (2014-2019)  
 
 
Source: Wyrzykowski, Robert (2020)  
 GSMA Mobile Internet Connectivity 2020 - Sub-Saharan Africa Factsheet  
 
Graph 4: Top five SSA countries of mobile internet use by index and enabler (2019)  
 
 




The digital divide concerning gender was considerable all over SSA. Its different dimensions 
reinforced each other, which indicates the problems of bridging this divide. Recent empirical 
studies in Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa revealed that it existed across all levels of analysis 
(Mulrean, 2020). In general, high mobile phone ownership but low Internet use were typical 
among Kenyan and Nigerian women as well as the female black mobile owners in South 
Africa. However, Kenya has the highest mobile penetration rate among women. Nevertheless, 
cell phones remained unaffordable to the many Kenyans living in extreme poverty. Even in 
Nigeria with its very low-price internet access, half of the Nigerian women living in extreme 
poverty were still unable to pay, because they had to prioritize necessary expenses for food, 
shelter and children’s education. The gender divide existed mainly because many women 
were unaware that they could access the Internet on their mobiles. Women in rural areas in all 
countries were disadvantaged additionally because of the uneven regional mobile network 
coverage (Mulrean, 2020).  
 
Graph 5: Digital gender gap, SSA, selected countries, 2019  
 
   
Source: FAO, 2021  
 
The COVID-19 pandemic widened the digital divide for rural women in SSA even more 
(Jones, 2021). Shortly after the Corona related lockdowns began, the daily app downloads in 
the financial technology (fintech) category jumped by about 30 % worldwide, above their pre-
lockdown baseline, with Africa also observing a substantial increase in this regard (Jones, 
2021). 
 
Digitalization impacts also significantly on the creation and maintenance of human relations 
and social institutions. Notably in urban centres and densely populated areas, it influences the 
way of people who use and continue to appropriate it, who invented it and thereby reinvent 
themselves, thus creating a novel, modern ‘urban society’ based on digital technology 
(Akindès & Kouamé Yao, 2019).  
 
Digital practices, now and again appear in new and unexpected guises. Apart from examples 
like mobile banking and internet use even by the poor and its multiple uses mentioned above, 
they conquer new realms like the informal sector. For example, they contribute to the 
modernisation of urban transport systems through the digitalisation of transactions. Also, 
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digitalization enables the use of social networks to reinvent funerary social structures in times 
of the Corona pandemic, etc. It even contributed to facilitating access to electricity and clean 
cooking in Sub-Saharan Africa by pay-as-you-go business models in the off-grid solar sector 
(Mazzoni, 2018).  
 
Certainly, digitalization improved accessibility of communications, which before had been 
impeded by poor infrastructure, thereby allowing the poor majority to participate e.g. in 
mobile banking and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in e-commerce. However, on the 
other hand, SSA countries could also face premature de-industrialization and other negative 
externalities under adverse economic conditions due to the effects of digitalization (Myovella 
et al 2020).  
 
Thus, the ‘digital revolution’ introduced innovative ways of experiencing the city and living 
in the city. However, despite the widespread adoption of mobile phones, the use of digital 
technology created already fault lines and inequalities between categories of users. Different 
lifestyles of users, according to income category, for example, represent not only new social 
practices encoded in the changing nature of urban citizenship. The new digital culture 
infiltrates various dimensions of social life. This concerns not only mobile banking and 
internet use, but also transport practices, small-scale trade, and modes of access to food, 
especially in times of Corona (Akindès & Kouamé Yao, 2019).  
 
A new strategy of ‘digital inclusion’ provides communication packages specially designed for 
the perceived opportunities of socio-economic niche markets, including offers for low-income 
groups corresponding to their unstable incomes and their specific needs. For example, ‘social 
connection passes’ or low-cost communication packages were offered, covering the hours of 
low network use in the morning or late in the evening. At the same time, this contributes to 
heavier use of the network, an increased number of users online and a better degree of 
capacity utilization, with the majority connecting during the time slots determined by their 
service packages. Examples of these packages include so-called ‘friends and family’ numbers, 
and ‘social connection passes’ or low-cost communication packages covering the hours of 
low network use, generally early in the morning or late in the evening. Thereby they provide 
access to digital social networks, messaging via WhatsApp, Skype, etc.) at a low cost making 
it affordable for the poor. Moreover, the policies of 'digital inclusion' could generate value 
from local knowledge and competence not only in the so-called 'poor' countries of Africa 
South of the Sahara but also concerning the African poor themselves. All this significantly 
contributed to the evolution of social interactions in terms of the duration of mobile 
communication, which was crucial under African conditions, dominated by the culture of 
orality (Akindès & Kouamé Yao, 2019).  
 
Besides, ethical perspectives like questions of power relations, post-colonialism and (gender) 
equality should be considered as well (Schelenz & Schopp, 2018). Behind each form of 
appropriation there hide inequalities and differences in practices according to social class. 
They could be an indicator for socio-economic differentiation by 'modernization' and thus 
open up new fields of study for the sociology of class-based practices (Akindès & Kouamé 
Yao, 2019). Last, but not least, this could also be used to map out valuable proposals to 
promote inclusive economic growth, notably in African cities. Besides, digitalization could 
deter corruption, at least concerning the perception of corruption and an increase in trust in 
tax officials. Yet, the dampening effect of digitalization on corruption was thwarted in 




Yet, the Janus face of digitalization should not be disregarded as well. In fact, improved 
digital access showed to be a double-edged sword. In 2019, at least six governments in Africa, 
including Sudan, DR Congo and Togo, shut down the internet for political reasons, often with 
the complicity of western providers. Also, the Tanzanian government tried to tax bloggers out 
of existence by imposing exorbitant fees, and the government in Kampala (Uganda) exerted a 
daily tax on the use of social media as Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp (Pilling, 2019).  
 
Even governments showed to be vulnerable. Many African countries became almost wholly 
reliant on Chinese companies, including Huawei and Transsion, a Shenzhen-based mobile 
phone provider that sold more phones in Africa than any other company. The latter even 
begun manufacturing in Ethiopia. But certain Chinese companies, including ZTE and 
Hikvision, provide at the same time the surveillance technology for autocratic African 
governments to monitor and spy on their population (Pilling, 2019). CloudWalk Technology, a 
Guangzhou start-up, even signed a deal with the government in Harare (Zimbabwe) to 
provide a mass facial recognition programme that will send data on millions of Zimbabwean 
citizens, captured by CCTV cameras, to the Chinese company, which still tried to improve 
technology to distinguish between African’s black faces (Pilling, 2019). 
 
However, the digitalization of social media is also responsible for the rapid spread of fake 
news and disinformation, notably under the restrictions to prevent the spread of the COVID-
19 pandemic. Government distrust, lockdown, and increased social media access accelerate 
for example the spread of misinformation and disinformation in DR Congo (Cirhigiri, 2020).  
 
 
 (3) Country case studies  
 
The following country case studies focus on Western Africa which had in 2019 a relatively 
high rate of connected users (29%), compared with Eastern Africa (20%) and Central Africa 
(22%). Only Southern Africa, dominated by South Africa, which counts already among the 
'Newly Industrialized-' or Middle-Income Countries (MICs) and therefore is not typically for 
SSA's LDCs, performed slightly better (s. Graph xy, above). 
 
The best West African performers, as indicated by the GSMA mobile connectivity index 2019, 
were Ghana (52%), Nigeria (49%), and Ivory Coast (44%), followed by Senegal (41%), Benin 
and Sierra Leone (both about 39%). Niger (18%) and Guinea-Bissau (24%) were at the lower 
end (GSMA Mobile Connectivity Index, 2019, countries).  
 
The affordability of mobile connectivity 3 was best in Nigeria (55%), Ghana and Mali (both 
48%), Guinea (Conakry) (47%), Burkina Faso (44%), Cote d'Ivoire (42%) (see Appendix for 








                                                 
3 Measured as “the availability of mobile services and devices at price points that reflect the level of income 
across a national population”  (including indicators like 'mobile tariffs', 'handset price', 'inequality' and 'taxation'), 
see Mobile Connectivity Index Methodology – GSMA, 2021.  
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1)  Côte d'Ivoire   
 
Graph 6: Mobile connectivity index, Côte d'Ivoire, 2019  
 
      
Source: GSMA Mobile Connectivity Index, Côte d'Ivoire, Oct. 2021  
 
Digitalization in Côte d'Ivoire, as elsewhere in SSA, was based on the development of the 
mobile telephony sector. The latter evolved in two distinctive waves which corresponded 
largely with economic growth and the recession because of socio-political turmoil and the 
civil war respectively, i.e. 1997-2012 and 2012-2019 (Capri, 2020). Although the Ivory Coast 
was a latecomer, compared with other SSA countries, it, later on, ranked high in the mobile 
connectivity index (rang 3 of 14 West African countries, see Appendix). Today, the mobile 
phone is fully integrated into Ivorian society mainly due to two factors: First, the government 
in the capital Yamoussoukro (de jure; de facto Abidjan) liberalized the mobile sector by 
creating an enabling legislative, juridical and regulatory institutional framework for private 
investors. Secondly, it promoted relatively early the second generation cellular telephony 
standard (Global System for Mobile Communications, GSM) that allowed for standardization 
of communication spaces. Thus, for example, one or more people connected to the same 
network could decide anytime to communicate or not. A central feature to facilitate this 
process was the mass distribution of cheap telephone recharge cards. Three major operators 
dominated the market: Orange, MTN and Moov, followed by five others: Cora, Comium, 
GreenN, WARID CI and Café Mobile. They operated mainly in the urban centres where it 
was most profitable, to the detriment of rural areas (Capri, 2020). 
 
The development of the spatial digital network started in Abidjan and its suburbs continued in 
the coastal zone with much tourism and proceeded afterwards to the second economic centre 
of the country around Bouaké. Later on, the other regions were conquered one by one by 
implanting basic mobile-phone structures in major places, serving as a base to cover the 




The introduction of prepaid services allowed customers to act economically and to control 
their consumption without committing themselves to fixed monthly subscriptions. Moreover, 
needy potential users, who could not afford their own handsets, were offered loans. This led 
several small-scale entrepreneurs even in the countryside to invent a new kind of business, i.e. 
to rent phones from other villagers and to bill their customers for each call. Thus, an informal 
economy emerged with ‘cellular cabins’ at all major city crossroads. The uncontrolled 
multiplication of these ‘cabins’ in densely populated areas had an unwelcomed side-effect, i.e. 
the saturation of networks, notably between 7 pm and 9 pm, when most jobholders had 
returned home and started their private chats and/or mobile business (Capri, 2020). Also, in 
the development phase, the Ivorian civil war (2002 – 2004) impaired the quality and growth 
of the cellular network, notably in the southern regions, because many users had fled the 
northern and western combat zones to reach the densely populated South where the technical 
infrastructure became overstrained (Capri, 2020).  
 
By mid of the 2010s, the major cities and their surroundings had been covered. This and the 
rapidly decreasing cost of the mobile phone service allowed for a phenomenal increase in its 
use also for other purposes. Consequently, digitalization changed the consumption habits of 
users significantly. Its costs, therefore, constituted in many user households a prominent part 
of household expenditure, immediately after housing and food. They spend up to 15% of their 
disposable income on digital services (Capri, 2020).  
 
The direct and indirect employment effects of the digital economy in the Ivory Coast were 
considerable as well. Jobs in the digital sector increased from 7,000 in 2007 to more than 
17,000 jobs in 2016. Thus, more money was spend on ICT services (0.2%) than on health 
(0.1%) and education (0.1%). The value added by the digital economy stood at F CFA 1,045 
billion, or 5.2% of real GDP in 2016, which generated taxes and duties of more than F CFA 
252 billion, or overall 14% of taxes collected in the country (Capri, 2020).  
Finally, digitalization also transformed the delivery of services related to health, agriculture 
and education fundamentally. Online platforms allowed doctors and healthcare professionals 
to communicate directly with patients, even in the countryside, through voice calls and text 
messages. However, the changes brought about by the ICT sector were no panacea. The 
digital divide, mentioned above, implied also the risk of exclusion and the perverse effects of 





2)  Ghana  
 
Graph 7: Mobile connectivity index, Ghana, 2019  
 
     
Source: GSMA Mobile Connectivity Index, Ghana, Oct. 2021  
 
 
Digitalization became a national goal in Ghana because the government expected from it the 
urgently needed upswing (Jodin, 2020). Vice President Mahamudu Bawumia underscored that 
Ghana could only make the much-needed strides in development when digital technology 
became the driver for all sectors of the economy, especially in the administration of land 
(Bawumia, 2021). Ghana’s digitalization grew rapidly thanks to early liberalization and 
deregulation since the late 1990s. It had a countrywide mobile coverage and a high mobile 
penetration rate of 131 SIM cards per 100 inhabitants, compared to an average of 80 in the 
rest of Africa (WB, 2019). As in other SSA countries, most urban centres advanced rapidly 
but the rural and remote areas were left behind. Moreover, even in the cities access to the 
Internet was limited and invaluable. The low-income strata in particular were excluded. 
During the Corona pandemic, the lockdown often was a threat to their existence (Kohnert, 
2021a).  
 
No wonder then, that in Ghana emerged a vibrant IT sector with companies such as 
mPedigree, Rancard, Softtribe, Hubtel, mPharma, Logiciel, Nosmay. They were fiercely 
competing in software and applications platforms for everything from finance and payments 
to agriculture and medical services (WB, 2019). Government digitalization programs included 
sectors like the ports and harbours, national health insurance services, utility bill payments, 
financial services and digital addressing systems (Ayakwah, et al, 2021). Cornerstone projects 
included a comprehensive digital address system, essential for digital commerce. Ghana’s 
National Identification project was Africa’s largest digitization project. It involved 
implementing an identity management system to promote equal access to physical and digital 
services, social inclusion and economic development. Over 5,000 bundles of registration and 
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identification kits were distributed all over the country aiming to register more than 100,000 
people per day in more than 2,000 registration centres. The kits were to include up to 14 
applets, like a payment platform, driver’s license, national health insurance and passport. 
They were explicitly meant also as a socio-economic inclusion project (Atea, 2021).  
 
 
3)  Togo  
 
Graph 8: Mobile connectivity index, Togo, 2019  
 
    
Source: GSMA Mobile Connectivity Index, Togo, Oct. 2021 
 
Togo’s mobile phone user penetration rate soared by 700% in the past five years from 2013 to 
2018, with about 80% of the population using a mobile phone in 2018. In January 2020, 1.71 
million Togolese were connected to the internet according to a study published by ‘Hootsuite 
and We Are Social’ on the use of the web and social networks in Togo. An increase of 7.8% 
compared with 2019. Internet access was improving with 17% of the population with regular 
access to the internet in December 2017, compared to 2.4% of the population in 2008. The 
overall internet penetration rate in 2019 was 21%, including 43.1% via mobile, 56.1% by 
computer, 0.7% by tablet. 650,000 subscribers were active on social networks (+ 14% 
between April 2019 and January 2020). 580,000 users regularly access Facebook (95.9% by 
mobile), 72,000 to Instagram, 170,000 to Linkedin (republicoftogo.com, 19.02.2020). There 
were 3 Instagram macro-influencers in Togo with an average following of 81 860 followers. 
The total reach of all Togolese Instagram macro-influencers combined is 245 581 followers 
(Hypetrace.com, 2020). TikTok is said to be used increasingly by Togo’s teenagers too. 
Influencers like the comedian influencer #Roland_Tikena allegedly count more than 12 Mio. 
views. Twitter and other social media networks are increasingly used both by the government 




In February 2020, three new actors joined the “Cizo” project that had already successfully met 
the challenge of electrifying 40,000 households in neighbouring Benin in 2019. These are off-
grid suppliers Fenix International, Solergie and Moon. A subsidiary of the French energy 
giant Engie, the Ugandan-based company Fenix International will compete with Solergie, 
which operates in Togo under a partnership with French oil giant Total. The Belgian company 
offers a solution called SolergieBox. It is a mini-grid made up of solar panels, an inverter and 
a battery for storing electricity. This off-grid solar system can supply eight households in rural 
areas. Households connected to the mini-grid can pay their bills via “mobile money”, a 
mobile phone payment system. The mobile phone is also a key piece of equipment in the 
service offered by Moon. This French company, which is also involved in the “Cizo” project, 
offers solar home kits. Its own is made up of solar panels, a storage system, and USB ports for 
recharging mobile phones. Unlike other suppliers of solar kits, its solution is accompanied by 
a smartphone (Moonphone) on which is installed an application that allows the payment of the 
solar kit in small amounts (in pay-as-you-go) (Kohnert, 2021. BTI-Togo). 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
Digitalization of private and public services took an expressive speed in the past two decades 
in many countries of Sub-Sahara Africa. It became the fastest-growing region worldwide in 
this respect. Mobile subscriber penetration amounted to about 45% in 2019, another 23% of 
the population additionally used the mobile internet regularly. Nevertheless, a digital divide 
became increasingly problematic. It concerned not only the traditional urban-rural contrast 
with all its well-known ramifications but – at least as important – the increasing gap between 
the rich and the poor, the people without access to mobile communication and the Internet put 
at a disadvantage because they were unable or to obtain only under difficult conditions digital 
information, shop online, participate democratically, or learn and offer skills. Thus, the digital 
divide entangled sweeping ethical perspectives too. The burning questions of the age-old 
debate on the impact of colonialism on the wretched of the earth have to be revived again and 
answered anew, including questions of power relations, post-colonialism and (gender) 
equality. Behind each form of digital appropriation there hide inequalities and differences in 
practices according to social class. Whether this constitutes an inevitable socio-economic 
differentiation owing to ‘modernization’ is open to question. In any case, governments would 
be well advised to go against it because otherwise they might be swept away by populist, 
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Résumé : La numérisation en Afrique subsaharienne a amélioré l'accessibilité des communications 
par la majorité des pauvres qui avaient été exclus, entre autres, des médias sociaux, des canaux 
d'information indépendants, des services bancaires mobiles et du commerce électronique. La 
création de nouvelles opportunités économiques, par ex. l'activité par répartition et 
l'augmentation du flux d'informations, ont également renforcé l'estime de soi des personnes, leur 
sentiment d'appartenance et de citoyenneté. Le smartphone est devenu la principale source 
d'accès à Internet, ce qui a également permis de combler le fossé entre les communautés 
urbaines et rurales. Ainsi, les télécommunications mobiles ont contribué positivement à la 
croissance économique, même dans les régions les moins développées, et il y a apparemment 
encore amplement de place pour de nouvelles améliorations. Pourtant, les Africains ont 
également été confrontés à de nouvelles formes fossé digital entre les pauvres et les riches, entre 
les pays africains avancés et moins avancés, ainsi qu'entre l'Afrique et le reste du monde. De 
plus, la numérisation de la sphère publique est devenue une arme à double tranchant. Des 
gouvernements autocratiques, comme le Soudan et le Togo, ont fermé Internet pendant les 
élections pour faciliter le trucage des élections. De plus, le manque de transparence et 
d'objectivité a alimenté les fausses informations qui se sont rapidement propagées sur les 
réseaux sociaux, notamment en période de crise de COVID-19. Enfin, tout le monde qui 
navigue sur Internet n'a pas le même accès à des informations de qualité. La désinformation 
était soutenue clandestinement par des puissances étrangères pour déstabiliser les régimes 
politiques, ou des logiciels espions fournis aux gouvernements pour contrôler l'opposition. Les 
fausses nouvelles dans les médias sociaux et les logiciels espions ont entravé la pauvreté en 
Afrique de manière significative.  
 
 
Zusammenfassung: Die Digitalisierung in Subsahara-Afrika verbesserte Kommunikations-Zugang 
für die Mehrheit der Armen, die bis dahin unter anderem von sozialen Medien, unabhängigen 
Informationskanälen, Mobile Banking und E-Commerce ausgeschlossen waren. Die Schaffung 
neuer wirtschaftlicher Möglichkeiten, z.B. das Umlageverfahren und der verstärkte 
Informationsfluss, stärkten auch das Selbstwertgefühl, das Zugehörigkeitsgefühl und das 
Nationalbewußtsein der Menschen. Das Smartphone wurde zur Hauptquelle des 
Internetzugangs, der auch die Kluft zwischen urbanen und ländlichen Gebieten überbrückte. 
Damit trug der Mobilfunk auch in weniger entwickelten Regionen positiv zum 
Wirtschaftswachstum bei, und es gibt offenbar noch viel Raum für weitere Verbesserungen. 
Afrikaner wurden aber auch mit neuen Formen der digitalen Kluft zwischen Arm und Reich, 
zwischen entwickelten und weniger entwickelten afrikanischen Ländern sowie zwischen Afrika 
und dem Rest der Welt konfrontiert. Zudem wurde die Digitalisierung der Öffentlichkeit zu 
einem zweischneidigen Schwert. Autokratische Regierungen wie der Sudan und Togo haben 
das Internet beispielsweise während der Wahlen abgeschaltet, um Wahlfälschung zu erleichtern. 
Zudem befeuerte der Mangel an Transparenz und Objektivität insbesondere in Zeiten der 
Corona-Krise fake news, die sich in den sozialen Medien rasant verbreiteten. Nicht zuletzt hatte 
nicht jeder, der im Internet surfte, den gleichen Zugang zu qualitativ hochwertigen 
Informationen. Desinformation wurde zudem oft heimlich von ausländischen Mächten 
unterstützt, um politische Regime zu destabilisieren, oder den Regierungen Spionagesoftware 
zur Verfügung gestellt, um die Opposition zu kontrollieren. Sowohl Desinformation in sozialen 





Appendix :  
 
Ranking of West African countries by GSMA Mobile Connectivity Index (2019)  
 
(1) Ghana : 52.0 
• Infrastructure: 49.1 
• Affordability: 48.4 
• Consumer Readiness: 59.5 
• Content and Services: 51.8 
 
(2) Nigeria : 49.1 
 Infrastructure: 42.6 
 Affordability: 55.0 
 Consumer Readiness: 50.8 
 Content and Services: 48.9 
 
(3) Cote d'Ivoire: 44.0 
 Infrastructure:     49.2 
 Affordability:     42.0 
 Consumer Readiness:     45.7 
 Content and Services:     39.6 
 
(4) Senegal : 41.3 
 Infrastructure: 49.7 
 Affordability: 44.6 
 Consumer Readiness: 43.7 
 Content and Services: 30.1 
 
(5) Benin : 39.1 
 Infrastructure: 47.7 
 Affordability: 33.6 
 Consumer Readiness: 43.8 
 Content and Services: 33.2 
 
(6) Sierra Leone : 38.6 
 Infrastructure: 33.3 
 Affordability: 39.0 
 Consumer Readiness: 42.3 
 Content and Services: 40.3 
 
(7) Togo : 35.9 
 Infrastructure :38.4 
 Affordability: 36.1 
 Consumer Readiness: 45.1 
 Content and Services: 26.5 
 
(8) Liberia : 34.4 
 Infrastructure: 35.6 
 Affordability: 22.9  
 
(9) Mali : 33.9 
 Infrastructure: 39.0 
 Affordability: 48.0 
 Consumer Readiness: 32.1 
 Content and Services: 22.0 
 
(10) Burkina Faso : 32.4 
 Infrastructure: 28.1 
 Affordability: 44.4 
 Consumer Readiness : 36.3 
 Content and Services: 24.5 
 
(11) Mauritania : 32.1 
18 
 
 Infrastructure: 24.5 
 Affordability: 39.7 
 Consumer Readiness: 42.8 
 Content and Services: 25.4 
 
(12) Guinea : 31.1 
 Infrastructure: 26.9 
 Affordability: 47.4 
 Consumer Readiness: 38.3 
 Content and Services: 19.3 
 
(13) Guinea-Bissau : 24.4 
 Infrastructure: 44.7 
 Affordability: 15.8 
 Consumer Readiness: 38.3 
 Content and Services: 13.1 
 
(14) Niger : 18.3 
 Infrastructure: 12.7 
 Affordability: 27.0 
 Consumer Readiness: 20.8 
 Content and Services: 15.6 
 
 
